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I. INTRODUCTION
In fall 1993, an agreement and a crucial tariff reduction opened the market
for export of Washington State apples to China.' This will be the first U.S. com-
1. Joe Haberstroh, Ripe for the Exporting-State Industry Eyes a Possibly Fruitful China Market with
Growing Anticipation, Caution, SEATrLE TIMs, Feb. 6, 1994, at Dl. China represents a market of 1.2 billion
people. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 7
mercial fruit shipment to China since 1949.2 Overnight, Washington State apple
growers became international commodity exporters.3 While the growers were
figuring out what grade and shade of apples the Chinese liked, their accountants
and bankers were no doubt arranging financing and credit. Can the lawyers be far
behind? If they are not, growers may suffer the same fate as Filanto, S.p.A.
(Filanto), an Italian shoe manufacturer, which recently lost an action in New York
involving the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).4
Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp.5 is the first U.S. judicial interpretation
of the CISG, and demonstrates that not understanding the nuances of the CISG
can cause major misinterpretations and affect the outcome of any case involving
the convention. In the case, Filanto brought suit for breach of contract against
Chilewich International Corporation (Chilewich), a New York international trad-
ing firm.6 The key issue presented was whether an agreement to arbitrate existed
between the parties.7 The court, applying the CISG, held that such an agreement
did exist.8 Why has the CISG suddenly been thrust into the forefront of inter-
national law? This article proposes a reason, then explains the convention's back-
ground before analyzing the case.
The world economic community is changing at a pace faster than ever before.
New technology in transportation and communication spurs the growth of com-
merce on a global scale.9 In 1992, world imports and exports totaled over $7533
billion.1" The interdependent structure of the world economy suggests the need
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I [hereinafter CISG], in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Documents of the Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings
of the Main Committee, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.3 (1981). CISG
signatories include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, the United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Multinational
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General as of 31 December 1992, at 364, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E/I 1
(1993).
5. Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 984
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
6. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1230.
7. Id. at 1235.
8. Id at 1239.
9. Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 265, 266 (1984) (discussing advantages of global unification of
international sales law).
10. DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2, 3 (1993) (International Monetary Fund). In 1992,
world imports were valued at U.S.$3846 billion, representing one-year growth of 8% and five-year growth of
60%. Id. At the same time, world exports were valued at U.S.$3687 billion, representing one-year growth of 7%
and five-year growth of 57%. Id U.S. imports for the same period amounted to $553 billion, representing one-
year growth of 9% and five-year growth of 30%. Id. Meanwhile, U.S. exports amounted to $447 billion,
representing one-year growth of 6% and five-year growth of 77%. Id. The International Monetary Fund
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for a unified set of legal rules to govern transactions in goods all over the
world."t While international traders share many of the same difficulties with
domestic traders, problems with delivery, party rights and obligations, and choice
of law are magnified due to differences in culture, language, and distance between
parties.'2 Due to the risk of misunderstanding, and the need for predictability in
determining legal costs, considerable emphasis and time is often allocated to
choice of law concerns during negotiations between multinational traders of
goods.
In the typical international business deal, choice of law and other legal issues
are decided after the crux of the bargain is negotiated. 3 While the parties cele-
brate their new found business, their lawyers are left to work out the details. t4
Due to an unfamiliarity with foreign law, as well as other self-interested reasons,
each side rejects the other side's law and demands its own law.15 The usual
compromise is the law of some neutral third country.'
6
Absent an agreement on the choice of law, international sales are governed
by the law of the state that has the most significant contact with the transaction,
such as the place where the contract was formed.' 7 The problem is that domestic
conflict of law rules may fail to clearly indicate which body of national law
should be applied. This may result in each state applying a different set of rules
Yearbook did not differentiate between sales of goods and services. Id.
11. Rosett, supra note 9, at 267.
12. Jack G. Stem, Note: A Practitioner's Guide to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 81, 83 (1983) (comparing differences between the
CISG and the UCC).
13. B. Blair Crawford, Drafting Considerations Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 187, 189 (1988) (reviewing various contract drafting
techniques for use when the CISG is involved).
14. IL
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. James E. Joseph, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 107, 108 (1984) (promoting
uniformity in international sales law). Other factors that can be used to decide which state has the most contact
with the transaction are the place where contract negotiation occurred; the place where the contract is to be
performed; the place where the subject matter of the contract is located; and the parties' domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 188 (1969). Section 188 provides:
In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the contacts to be taken into account...
include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties.
Il
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under identical circumstances.18 Consequently, the transnational practitioner risks
litigation involving an unfamiliar area of law.' 9 The CISG provides international
traders with a ready compromise on choice of law, allowing predictability as well
as reducing the time and costs of negotiating the choice of law.2" Given the
advantages, and continued growth in international trade, it is no wonder that the
CISG has enjoyed increasing popularity.2 '
This article reviews Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp.,22 the first U.S.
judicial interpretation of the CISG, and demonstrate that failing to understand the
nuances of the international treaty can cause major misinterpretations and affect
the outcome of any case involving the convention. To lay a foundation, part II
explores the CISG's history and scope.' Part III compares the battle of the
forms doctrine under the common law, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
and the CISG.24 Part IV then details the facts of Filanto and the court's reason-
ing and interpretation of the CISG.25 Next, part V critiques the court's opinion
and offers alternative resolutions.26 Finally, part VI concludes with some
thoughts on CISG interpretation.27
II. THE CISG
A. History of the CISG
The development of the CISG began over fifty years ago in Europe with the
goal of drafting a generally acceptable uniform law on international sales.2' The
project's genesis was provided by Benito Mussolini, then dictator of Italy, who
offered the League of Nations the necessary backing for an institution in Rome
that would work on the unification of the law.29 In 1930, the United Nations
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) formed a
committee of experts to prepare a draft of uniform law on the international sale
18. Joseph, supra note 17, at 108.
19. Id.
20. Stem, supra note 12, at 83.
21. Joseph, supra note 17, at 107-08; V. Suzanne Cook, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 197, 198
(1988) (promoting uniform interpretation of the CISG).
22. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237.
23. See infra notes 28-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 69-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 98-143 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 144-88 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
28. JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNiFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION 49 (1982); Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts,
in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS 1-2, 1-4 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984).
29. Joseph, supra note 17, at 109.
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of goods.3" The experts came from France, Germany, England, and Scandinavia,
and represented four principal systems of law found in the world; the Anglo-
American, Latin, Germanic, and Scandinavian systems.3 Preliminary drafts of
uniform law for the international sale of goods were produced in 1935 and
1939.32 Meanwhile in 1934, the UNIDROIT formed another committee, made
up of representatives from Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Peru, and Sweden,
to draft international law on the formation of contracts.3 This committee
produced a draft outlining international law on the formation of contracts in1936.3
The work of both committees came to a halt with the advent of World War
II, but not without making significant contributions to what one day would be the
CISG.35 For example, rather than modifying or piecing together rules from then-
existing sales law, the drafters decided to write a whole new text.36 Secondly,
the drafters restricted the uniform law to international sales only; feeling that
extending the law to domestic sales would make it more difficult for states to
adopt the text.37 Lastly, the drafters recognized the principle of party autonomy,
whereby parties to a contract are expressly allowed to exclude application of the
uniform law, or derogate from any of, its provisions, even if the contract fell
within the scope of the uniform law.38
After World War II, and throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, work contin-
ued on both texts.39 In 1964, the government of the Netherlands sponsored an
international conference of twenty-eight nations to meet at the Hague.40 While
the United States and several Eastern European countries participated, most of the
delegates were from Western Europe.4' After three tension-filled weeks, the
conference adopted two conventions, the Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts (ULF).42
These conventions formally went into effect in 1972 after ratification by five
nations.43
30. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-4; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 49.
31. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-5.
32. Id.; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 49.
33. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-6.
34. Id at 1-6 n.8 (citing the 1936 text on formation: Preliminary Draft of a Uniform Law on International
Contracts Made by Correspondence, reprinted in UNIDROIT, Unification of Law: 1948, at 160-67 (1948)).
35. Winship, supra note 28 at 1-6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1-6 to 1-7.
38. Id at 1-7.
39. Id. at 1-8 to 1-9; HoNNOLD, supra note 28, at 49.
40. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-9; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 49.
41. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-9.
42. d ; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 49.
43. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-13; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 49. The ULIS was ratified by Belgium,
Gambia, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, San Marino, and the United Kingdom. Winship, supra note 28,
at 1-13 n.25. The ULF was ratified by the same countries with the exception of Israel. Id.
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Meanwhile in 1968, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) surveyed world governments as to whether widespread
adoption of the ULIS and ULF was feasible.' The response was negative.45 As
one commentator noted:
Not only were there complaints about the sphere of application but there
was criticism of the abstractness of several key concepts and the failure
to take into account the interests of many third world and socialist
countries which had not participated in the 1964 Conference [that led to
the development of the ULIS and ULF]. 46
Based on the above, the UNCITRAL concluded that widespread adoption of the
ULIS and ULF was not possible, and assembled a working group comprised of
a cross section of fourteen world members to prepare a new text.4
7
Over the course of nine meetings between 1970 and 1978, the group revised
the concepts underlying the ULIS and ULF, and combined the results into a new
text dealing with both contract formation and parties' rights." Thereafter, the
UNCITRAL presented the text to the United Nations General Assembly with a
recommendation that a diplomatic conference be assembled to consider the
text.49 The General Assembly accepted the recommendation and called a
convention in Vienna during the spring of 1980.50 On April 11, 1980, after
considerable debate and several amendments, delegates from sixty-two countries
and eight international organizations adopted the UNCITRAL text, later called the
CISG.5 t Thereafter, the CISG entered into force on January 1, 1988.52
44. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-13; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 53. The UNCITRAL, created in 1966
to unify international trade law, conducted the survey in anticipation that the two conventions would not meet
with worldwide acceptance. Id.
45. Honnold, supra note 28, at 53.
46. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-12.
47. Id at 1-13. This new text was based on the ULIS and ULF, but went further by incorporating the
concerns of countries with different legal, social, and economic systems, in the hope of assuring widespread
adoption. Id.; HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 53. The initial members of the working group were Brazil, France,
Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States Id. at 54 n.9.
48. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-14; HoNNOLD, supra note 28, at 53. Combining the concepts of contract
formation and parties' rights into one text was due to the group's goal of wide international acceptance of the
new text. John Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Overview,
27 Am. J. COMp. L. 223, 226 (1979) (discussing the CISG draft).
49. Winship, supra note 28, at 1-14.
50. l
51. Id
52. Maureen T. Murphy, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Creating Uniformity in International Sales Law, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 727, 727 n.3 (1989) (promoting
uniform ratification of the CISG). The CISG entered into force 13 months after the deposit with the United
Nations of instruments of ratification from 11 of the contracting states. Id. The ratification of at least 10 states
were required for the CISG to enter into force. Id The original signatories were Argentina, China, Egypt, France,
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B. Scope of the CISG
Several basic requirements are necessary for the CISG to apply. First, the
contract must be executed on or after January 1, 1988. Second, the parties' places
of business must be in different countries.53 The countries must also be
signatories to the CISG.s4 For example, if X Inc., with a place of business in
France, decides to sell widgets to Y Ltd., with a place of business in Germany,
this requirement is met since France and Germany are both signatories to the
CISG.
If one of the countries where the business is located is not a signatory, the
rules of private international law may still lead to the application of the CISG.55
For example, if X Inc. decides to sell to Z Corp., with its place of business in
Japan, the CISG may not necessarily apply. This is because Japan is not a
signatory and thus does not meet the requirement that both countries be
signatories. However, if the choice of law clause in the contract specifies the
national law of a country that is a signatory, and if treaties in that country are
given greater effect than national law, then the CISG will apply.56 For example,
in the X-to-Z sale, if the choice of law clause specified French law, and treaties
are given greater weight than French national law, then the CISG will apply
because France is a signatory.
While the CISG generally states that it covers the sale of goods,57 articles
2 and 3 exclude certain items from the definition of goods.58 Article 2 excludes
Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Syria, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Id. The CISG is a self-executing
treaty, meaning that after its ratification in 1986 by the U.S. Senate, the CISG became part of U.S. law merely
by virtue of its entering into force on January 1, 1988. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 99.
53. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 1(I).
54. Id art. l(l)(a).
55. Id art. l(1)(b). A full discussion on the rules of private international law is beyond the scope of this
article. For a thorough analysis, see Kenneth C. Randall & John E. Norris, A New Paradigm for International
Business Transactions, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 599 (1993). See also PETER NORTH, PRVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS (1993).
56. See CISG, supra note 4, art. l(1)(b). Article l(1)(b) provides that "[t]his convention applies to
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States... when the rules
of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State." Id.
57. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 1(1). Because of technicalities associated with diverse translations of the
word by different countries and cultures, the CISG provides Rules for borderline cases rather than one general
definition of "globe." Winship, supra note 28, at 1-25.
58. CISG, supra note 4, arts. 2, 3. Article 2 of the CISG provides:
This Convention does not apply to sales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or
at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
bought for any such use;
(b) by auction;
(c) on execution or otherwise by authority of law;
(d) of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money;
(e) of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft;
(f) of electricity.
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from the CISG's definition of goods those items bought for personal, family, or
household use.59 This is designed to exclude consumer sales transactions because
in some countries, protective rules are narrowly constructed based on the
principles of consumer protection, and therefore conflict in principle with the
CISG's intentionally broad language. 6° Article 2 also excludes sales by auc-
tion,61 sales of stock or other negotiable instruments,62 sea vessels and air-
craft,63 and electricity.' Meanwhile, article 3 excludes mixed contracts in
which greater than half of the contract value is for services. 6' Thus, because the
CISG's definition of goods is narrow, one of the transnational practitioner's first
steps is to assess the nature of the "goods" involved.
The CISG primarily focuses on contract formation and the parties' rights and
obligations.' It does not, however, cover the validity of the contract and issues
such as fraud, duress, illegality, and mistake.67 Thus, the validity of a contract
under the CISG is apt to cause more uncertainty and litigation than any other
portion of the contract. Consequently, practitioners who choose the CISG as
governing law may want to incorporate express provisions governing contract
validity.68
Id. art. 2. Article 3 of the CISG provides:
(1) Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are to be considered sales
unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials
necessary for such manufacture or production.
(2) This Convention does not apply to contracts in which the preponderant part of the obligations
of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labor or other services.
Il art. 3.
59. Id. art. 2(a).
60. Warren Khoo, Exclusions from Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW
34, 37 (Michael J. Bonnell ed., 1987) (discussing matters which are expressly excluded under the CISG).
61. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 2(b). The CISG drafters excluded auctions because they felt auctions
were a type of sales transaction that was only of marginal importance in international transactions. Khoo, supra
note 60, at 37. At an auction, the seller does not know who the successful bidder is until the hammer is down
and therefore does not know whether the sale is governed by the CISG. Id. If the CISG is exercised in this
situation, it would apply in a random fashion, which drafters felt undesirable. Id.
62. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 2(d). Sales of stock and other negotiable instruments were excluded to
accommodate the thinking of legal systems which do not regard commercial paper and money as "goods" and
therefore find it unacceptable that such items would be covered by the CISG. Khoo, supra note 60, at 38.
63. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 2(e). Sea vessels and aircraft were excluded because the sales law of
some countries do not include ships, vessels, aircraft, and hovercraft as "goods." Khoo, supra note 60, ht 38.
64. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 2(0. Electricity is not considered a "good" in some legal systems since
there are difficulties in attributing to it all the legal qualities of a physical object. Khoo, supra note 60, at 38-39.
65. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 3(b). Under a mixed contract, a preponderant part of the obligations is
the supply of labor and services, with the remainder of the contract for the supply of goods. Khoo, supra note
60, at 42. In such a contract, the CISG would be applicable only to that part of the contract pertaining to the
supply of goods. Id. at 43.
66. Paul C. Blodgett, The U.N. Convention on the Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 18
COLO. LAw. 421, 422 (1989) (reviewing the effect of the CISG on the international battle of the forms).
67. Id. at 422; Stem, supra note 12, at 88.
68. Blodgett, supra note 66, at 428.
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III. BATrLE OF THE FORMS
For the purposes of this article, and because Filanto involved a situation
depicting a "battle of the forms," the following discussion will center on the
difference between the CISG and the UCC treatment of the battle of the forms.
6 9
The "battle of the forms" is a phrase used by U.S. courts to describe an
exchange of forms between two parties which contain different written proposals
but are used to memorialize the same transaction. 0 The battle of the forms
occurs both domestically and in the international arena.7" As one commentator
noted:
Parties to international contracts commonly exchange preprinted general
conditions forms or standard contracts during contract formation. General
conditions forms contain terms often supplied by international trade
organizations, to which the parties attach importance. Similarly, standard
contracts also refer to internationally recognized trade terms. Both have
achieved major importance in international trade.72
When terms on preprinted forms conflict, the problem of determining which
term controls the transaction arises. For example, A sends B a purchase order for
100 widgets, in effect offering to buy 100 widgets. On the back of the purchase
order form is fine print stipulating that the law of A's country controls the
transaction. Subsequently, B agrees to the deal by sending a sales agreement for
100 widgets. On the back of the agreement of sale is also fine print stating that
the law governing the transaction is that of B's country. The foregoing example
presents many questions, chief among them being whether a contract was even
formed, and what law governs the contract if it was formed. As the following
sections demonstrate, the common law found in a majority of the United States,
the UCC, and the CISG treat the situation differently.
69. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 (1993) with CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(3). UCC § 2-207 prevents parties
from using conflicting choice of law clauses to deny the formation of a contract. See Blodgett, supra note 66,
at 424. Meanwhile, the CISG article 19(3) specifically provides that a difference in choice of law clauses
materially affects and prevents the formation of a contract. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(3).
70. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 170-71 (2d ed. 1990).
71. See Christine Moccia, Comment, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 649, 658 (1990) (promoting the use of CISG
principles in resolving any international battle of the forms).
72. Id
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A. Under the Common Law
Under the common law, to validly accept an offer and create a contract, the
acceptance of an offer had to match the offer exactly.73 In other words, the
acceptance had to be the "mirror image" of the offer in order to form a
contract.74 An acceptance that varied from the terms of the offer was not a valid
acceptance, and turned the offeree's response into a counteroffer.75 One benefit
of the mirror-image rule is that both parties know exactly the terms of the
contract.76 However, the mirror-image rule is practical only when the transaction
is memorialized by one document.77 When the sale of goods is completed by the
exchange of form contracts, the mirror-image rule becomes an impractical
restriction.78 In Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,79 the buyer added a
term to his acceptance of the seller's offer.80 The buyer found the contract
contrary to his interests and refused to perform.8" On appeal, the buyer argued
the mirror-image rule, and was allowed to back out of the transaction.8 2 The
buyer claimed that one of the terms in his acceptance varied from the terms in the
offer, and was allowed to claim there was no contract even though that term did
not detract from the substance of the deal. 3 Poel became a rallying cry for those
opposed to the application of the mirror-image rule in contract law." The
opponents of the rule felt it unfair to allow parties to withdraw from unfavorable
transactions based on legal technicalities.8 ' As the following section demon-
strates, the drafters of the UCC addressed this problem in the UCC article 2,
section 2-207.
73. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 170.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Blodgett, supra note 66, at 424.
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915). In the case, plaintiff Poel was
attempting to sell rubber to defendant Brunswick. Id. at 621-22. Poel sent an offer and Brunswick purportedly
accepted with a standard memo form that contained an extra term requiring immediate delivery by Poel. Id. at
622. Brunswick then contended that the purported acceptance was actually an offer because it differed from the
terms of Poel's original offer, and thus no contract was formed. Id. The court in its opinion agreed with
Brunswick and allowed Brunswick to back out of the transaction. Id. at 623.
80. Poel, 110 N.E. at 623.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Robert M. Rosh, Note: Demilitarizing the Battle of the Forms: A Peace Proposal, 1990 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 553, 556 (1990).
85. Id.
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B. Under the UCC
With a few exceptions, the UCC is a codification of case law which pertains
to the rules of U.S. contract law relating to the sale of goods.86 The UCC is
divided into eleven substantive articles which deal with different areas of
commercial law.87 Article 2 is of primary concern because it applies to all
transactions in goods and is generally the UCC counterpart of the CISG.8'
UCC article 2, section 2-207(1) states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance
even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered
or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or different terms.89
This essentially means that a contract is formed even if the acceptance varies
materially with the terms of the offer." The drafters of the UCC skillfully
worded the section to prevent parties from using a modified acceptance to deny
the formation of a contract.9 ' Thus, when two parties have conflicting choice of
law clauses, it will not prevent the formation of a contract.92 However, as shown
below, a different outcome arises under the CISG.
C. Under the CISG
Rather than adopting the approach of the UCC, the drafters of the CISG chose
instead to apply a modified mirror-image rule.93 Like the UCC, an acceptance
86. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 31. While CISG article 2 defines "goods" by stating what they are
not, the UCC defines "goods" by defining what they are. See U.C.C. § 2-105(l) (1993). UCC § 2-105(l)
provides that "[a] "good" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract." Id
87. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 30. The UCC is divided into 11 substantive articles: Art. 1, General
Provisions; Art. 2, Sales; Art. 2A, Leases; Art. 3, Commercial Paper; Art. 4, Bank Deposits and Collections; Art.
4A, Funds Transfers; Art. 5, Letters of Credit; Art. 6, Bulk Transfers; Art. 7, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading and Other Documents of Title; Art. 8, Investment Securities; Art. 9, Secured Transactions; Sales of
Accounts and Chattel Paper. Id
88. Id at 30 n.2.
89. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1993).
90. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 173. The portion of the acceptance which materially affects the offer
is left out of the contract. Id.
91. Blodgett, supra note 66, at 424.
92. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 173.
93. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(1). Article 19(1) provides that "[a] reply to an offer which purports
to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and
constitutes a counter offer." Id The drafters believed that this would encourage the parties to carefully negotiate
and agree on all terms prior to performance. Blodgett, supra note 66, at 425.
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under the CISG which differs from the terms of the offer will still constitute an
acceptance if it does not materially affect the substance of the offer, and if the
offeror does not promptly reject the alteration. 4 However, unlike the UCC, an
acceptance under the CISG which differs materially from the terms of the offer
will not result in a contract.95 To prevent any confusion, the CISG lists those
items considered to materially affect the substance of the offer.96 For example,
an arbitration clause is considered to be a material item.97 Thus, under the CISG,
there is less uncertainty as to what constitutes an agreement when the acceptance
varies the offeror's terms.
IV. FIRST U.S. CASE TO INTERPRET THE CISG
A. Facts
Filanto, an Italian shoe manufacturer, brought suit for breach of contract
against Chilewich, a New York international trading firm.98 The key issue pre-
sented was whether an agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties."
In February 1989, Byerly Johnson, Ltd., an agent of Chilewich operating in
the United Kingdom, signed an agreement (the Russian Contract) with
Raznoexport, the Soviet Foreign Economic Association."° The Russian Contract
obligated Byerly to supply footwear to Raznoexport and also contained an
arbitration clause (the Russian arbitration clause) stating that disputes were to be
settled in what is now the Republic of Russia (Russia).t"' Five months later,
Chilewich and Filanto exchanged their first correspondence.10 2 Chilewich's
94. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(2). Article 19(2) provides:
[A] reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or different terms
which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror,
without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does
not object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the
acceptance.
Il
95. l
96. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(3). Article 19(3) provides that "[a]dditional or different terms relating
to the price, payment, quality and quantity of goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability
to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially." Id.
97. Id. In contrast with the CISG, the UCC does not explicitly state what a material item is; rather the
UCC opts to provide examples only. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1993).
98. Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 984
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
99. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1235.
100. Id at 1230-31.
101. Id. The Russian arbitration clause stated in pertinent part, "All disputes or differences which may arise
out of or in connection with the present Contract are to be settled, jurisdiction of ordinary courts being excluded,
by the Arbitration at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Moscow, in accordance with the
Regulations of the said Arbitration." Id.
102. d at 1231.
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initial letter to Filanto referred to Chilewich and Byerly's visit to Filanto's
factories in Italy to negotiate the purchase of shoes to fulfill the Russian
Contract. 3 Along with the letter, Chilewich sent another contract to cover the
purchase of shoes and a copy of the Russian Contract, the terms of which
Chilewich explained governed the purchase of Filanto's shoes.13 4 Two months
later in September 1989, Filanto wrote to Chilewich regarding another purchase
contract that stipulated terms of the Russian Contract.105 Filanto stated that it
would accept only some of the Russian terms, effectively excluding the Russian
arbitration clause. 6 This fact, if undisputed, would show Filanto's intention not
to be bound by the Russian arbitration clause. Chilewich denied ever receiving
this letter.10 7
In March 1990, Chilewich sent Filanto a standard merchant's memo, for
signature by both parties and already signed by Chilewich, to confirm terms of
delivery and performance.10 8 Both Filanto and Chilewich agreed that this
constituted an offer."° The merchant's memo also provided that it was under-
stood between Filanto and Chilewich that the terms of the Russian Contract
governed, including the Russian arbitration clause.110 Two months later, Filanto
still had not replied to the March 1990 letter. However, Chilewich proceeded to
open a letter of credit in favor of Filanto."1
Filanto answered Chilewich's March memo in August 1990, returning it to
Chilewich signed, but attached a cover letter effectively excluding the Russian
arbitration clause.' On the same day and in response, Chilewich telexed Byerly
stating that it would not open the second letter of credit without receiving from
Filanto a signed copy of the contract without exclusions."' Several weeks later
in September 1990, Byerly sent a fax to Filanto asking Filanto to accept all terms
of the Russian Contract 14
The remainder of the facts presented during the trial were highly disputed.
Chilewich claimed that over a course of meetings, Filanto agreed to the terms of
103. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1231.
104. Id
105. I
106. ld
107. Id.
108. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
109. Id at 1238.
110. Id at 1231. The terms stipulated by the memorandum agreement were as follows: Filanto would
deliver 100,000 pairs of boots to Chilewich at the Italy-Yugoslavia border on September 15, 1990; Filanto would
deliver a balance of 150,000 pairs of boots on November 1, 1990; Chilewich would open one letter of credit
in Filanto's favor prior to the September 15, 1990 delivery; and Chilewich would open a second letter of credit
in Filanto's favor prior to the November 1, 1990 delivery. Id
111. Filanto, 789 F.Supp. at 1232.
112. Id Filanto's cover letter excluded all but three conditions of the Russian contract. Id
113. Id
114. Id
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the Russian Contract." 5 Filanto claimed just the opposite." 6 Ultimately, while
Chilewich bought and paid for 60,000 pairs of boots in January 1991, it did not
order and pay for the remaining 90,000 pairs called for by Chilewich's original
order.'17 It is Chilewich's failure to buy the second allotment that formed the
basis for Filanto's breach of contract action against Chilewich."8
B. Procedural History
Filanto initially brought action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York for breach of contract against Chilewich." 9 Subsequently,
on July 24, 1991, Chilewich moved to stay this action, arguing that the matter
should be arbitrated in Russia first."t One year later, Filanto moved to enjoin
arbitration or, in the alternative, for an order directing arbitration in New York
rather than Moscow due to the unsettled political conditions in Russia. 2' It is
against this background that the dispute came before Chief Judge Brient of the
district court.
C. The Opinion
Filanto first stated that the CISG applied in this case, presumably because it
was between two international parties.' Citing article 19(1) of the CISG,'2
Filanto argued that its letter to Chilewich on August 7, 1990, which partially
rejected the Russian arbitration clause, was a counteroffer. 2 4 Furthermore,
Filanto argued that Chilewich accepted the terms of the counteroffer in a letter
dated September 27, 1990."z Thus, Filanto argued that there was no agreement
to arbitrate in Russia, and as such, its breach of contract claim should be
continued in New York.1
26
Chilewich made no mention of the CISG. Instead, it argued that Filanto's
silence after Chilewich opened a letter of credit was an acceptance of the terms
of the March 13, 1990 offer. 27 Chilewich believed that Filanto's August 7,
115. Id at 1233.
116. Id
117. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1233.
118. Id
119. Id at 1229.
120. Id at 1234.
121. Id
122. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238.
123. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 19(1). Article 19 states, "A reply to an offer which purports to be an
acceptance but contains . . . modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counteroffer." Id.
124. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238.
125. Id
126. Id
127, Id
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1990 letter rejecting the Russian arbitration clause was a modification proposal,
which Chilewich promptly rejected.1 Thus, Chilewich argued, the original
offer was left intact and accepted, opening the way to stay Filanto's breach of
contract action pending arbitration in Russia.' 29
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that (1) the
question of whether Filanto and Chilewich agreed to arbitrate was governed by
federal law; (2) general principles of contract law such as the UCC did not apply
here, but rather, the federal law of contracts to apply was found in the CISG; (3)
Filanto and Chilewich did agree to arbitrate in Russia; and (4) arbitration in
Russia would be ordered in the interests of justice. t30
The court justified its application of the CISG by explaining that the CISG
was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1986,3' and entered into force between the
United States and other signatories, including Italy, as of January 1, 1988.32
Citing article 1(1)(a) of the CISG, the court stated that "absent a choice of law
provision, the CISG governs all contracts between parties with places of business
in different nations, so long as both nations are signatories to the [CISG].' 33
In so holding, the court observed that Filanto had its factories in Italy and
Chilewich's principal place of business was located in White Plains, New
York."3 Thus, the court applied the rules of the CISG to the facts presented.
The court narrowed its focus to determining the sole issue of whether a
written agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties.1 35 The court reasoned
that other issues pertaining to the existence of a contract were best left to
arbitrators. 36 The court further justified its approach by citing article 81(1) of
the CISG, and concluding that the contract and the arbitration clauses included
therein were severable.137
The court determined that an agreement existed based on Filanto's failure to
object to the arbitration clause in a timely fashion.1 38 The court pointed out that
"an offeree who, knowing that the offeror. has commenced performance, fails to
notify the offeror of its objection ... will ... be deemed to have assented to
128. Id.
129. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238.
130. Id. at 1236-37, 1239-40.
131. Id. at 1237.
132. Id.
133. Id (emphasis added).
134. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1230.
135. Id. at 1239.
136. Id. The court felt it lacked the authority to resolve all issues presented by the case because once an
agreement to arbitrate was validated, it was the arbitrator named in the contract, having derived his or her power
from the contract, who had the authority to decide on the validity of the remaining issues. Id
137. Id. Article 81(1) of the CISO states in part, "Avoidance [of the contract] does not affect any provision
of the contract for the settlement of disputes." See CISG, supra note 4, art. 81(1).
138. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
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[such] terms [of the offeror]."' 39 Then the court cited the first part of CISG
article 18(1) which reads, "A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree
indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance."'"' Relying on CISG article
8(3), 4t the court stated that "[i]n light of the extensive [course of] prior dealing
between [the] parties, Filanto was certainly under a duty to alert Chilewich in
timely fashion to its objections."142 Consequently, the court interpreted the
phrase "other conduct" to encompass Filanto's silence, and thus ruled that Filanto
accepted the offer by its silence.' 43
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the Court's Opinion
There are four discrepancies in the court's opinion: (1) the court's reasoning
in applying the CISG was questionable, (2) Chilewich's offer may have lapsed,
(3) Chilewich may not have commenced performance by opening the letter of
credit, and (4) Filanto may not have had a duty to alert Chilewich of its
objections.
While the court was correct in applying the CISG, its reason for doing so was
questionable. The District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded
139. Id. The court based its ruling on § 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id. Paragraph 1 of
§ 69 provides:
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an
acceptance in the following cases only:
(a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to
reject them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensa-
tion.
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be
manifested by silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends
to accept the offer.
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree should
notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). The court also based its ruling on case law. Filanto, 789
F. Supp. at 1240 (citing Graniteville v. Star Knits of California, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 587,589-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that a party who failed timely to object to a sales note containing an arbitration clause was deemed to
have accepted its terms); Imptex Int'l Corp. v. Lorprint, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1572, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding
that a party who failed to object to the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a sale confirmation agreement was
bound to arbitrate)).
140. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
141. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 8(3). Article 8(3) of the CISG states:
In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct
of the parties.
Id.
142. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
143. Ia
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that the CISG was applicable because Italy and the United States are signatories
of the Convention.'" Article 1 states that the CISG governs all contracts
between parties with places of business in different nations. 45 In doing so, the
court noted that Chilewich's "principal" place of business is located in White
Plains, New York."' However, this approach is erroneous because article 1 does
not state "principal" place of business.'47 Rather, it merely states "place of
business" and thus indicates that a party may have more than one place of
business.148 In fact, article 10 of the CISG provides for selecting the relevant
place of business when there is more than one. 149 Within the context of article
10, the drafters of the CISG originally considered the use of the phrase
"'principal' place of business," to connote the relevant place of business.' 0
However, the drafters found the term "'principal' place of business" to be too
rigid and substituted "the place of business.., which has the closest relationship
to the contract and its performance" to promote flexibility in interpretation.'15
Chilewich has more than one place of business. While incorporated in New
York, Chilewich also has an agent in the United Kingdom, Byerly Johnson,
Ltd.152 Therefore, the United Kingdom could be considered another "place of
business."' Further, article 10 of the CISG states that where the party has
more than one place of business, the place of business is that which has the
144. Id. at 1237.
145. L
146. Id. at 1230.
147. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 1.
148. Id. Article 1 provides:
This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are
in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State.
Id.
149. Id. art. 10(a). Article 10(a) states that "[flor purposes of [the CISGI, if a party has more than one
place of business, the place of business is that which has the closest relationship to the contract and its
performance." Id.
150. Gyula Eorsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CoNTRAc'rs FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODs 2-1, 2-27 to 2-29 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds.,
1984).
151. Id.
152. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1230. Byerly Johnson Ltd. represented and transacted business for Chilewich
in negotiations with Raznoexport, a Soviet economic association that desired to import shoes. Id.
153. Some commentators have expressed that an agency does not reflect a place of business. HONNOLD,
supra note 28, at 150; Eorsi, supra note 150, at 2-27. However, the agent referred to by these authors is the
transitory, traveling agent who conducts negotiations without establishing any permanent place of business.
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 150. Byerly Johnson, Ltd. is a British corporation and can hardly be called a
transitory person.
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closest relationship to the contract and its performance.1 4 The contract between
Filanto and Chilewich called for the delivery of boots by Filanto to Chilewich at
the border between Italy and Yugoslavia. 5 These facts support the proposition
that the United Kingdom may alternatively be considered Chilewich's place of
business as defined under article 10 of the CISG. First, Chilewich's agent in the
United Kingdom negotiated the original transaction to sell shoes to Russia.
Second, performance of the contract calls for delivery of boots to the Italian-
Yugoslav border. The United Kingdom is geographically closer to that border
than New York, and therefore is the place of business that has the closest
relationship to the contract and its performance for purposes of CISG interpreta-
tion. The practical problem is that the United Kingdom is not a signatory to the
convention. 56 Thus, rather than applying the CISG, the court could have
applied private international law, which may have resulted in the application of
English contract law and provided a different outcome.
Under English common law, an acceptance must be unqualified and exactly
match the terms of the offer.'57 If an acceptance varies from the terms of the
offer, it is classified as a counteroffer. 58 Thus, under English common law,
Filanto's modified acceptance on August 7, 1990, would have been classified as
a counteroffer, precluding contract formation since the modified acceptance was
promptly rejected by Chilewich 5 9
Another item overlooked by the court is that Chilewich's offer to Filanto may
have lapsed. Chilewich's offer to Filanto was made on March 13, 1990."
Filanto did not reply until August 7, 1990, nearly five months later. 6 CISG
article 18(2) states in part, "An acceptance is not effective if the indication of
assent does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed, or if no time is
fixed, within a reasonable time."' 62 If the trade usage 63 shows that five
154. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 10(a). Article 10(a) provides:
If a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which has the closest
relationship to the contract and its performance, having regard to the circumstances known to or
contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.
Id
155. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1231.
156. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing the signatories to the CISG).
157. See G.H. TREtTEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 18 (8th ed. 1991); T. ANTONY DOwNs, A TTBOOK
ON CONTRACT 64 (2d ed. 1991).
158. TRErrEL, supra note 157, at 19.
159. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1232. In response to Filanto's modified acceptance, Chilewich informed
Filanto through an intermediary that Chilewich would not open a second letter of credit unless Filanto agreed
to the original terms of the offer. Id.
160. Id at 1231.
161. Id at 1232.
162. CISG, supra note 4, art. 18(2).
163. "Trade usage" is the usage or custom commonly observed by persons conversant in, or connected
with, a particular trade. BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 1495 (6th ed. 1990). An example of such a trade is the
importation or exportation of goods.
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months is not a reasonable time for reply, a court could have found that the
March 13, 1990 offer had lapsed, thus making the August 7, 1990 letter an offer
in itself. This would support Filanto's argument,164 which, however, did not
persuade the court. 65
Another possible oversight is that Chilewich may not have commenced
performance by opening the letter of credit. Typically, the advising bank would
notify the exporter, in this case, Filanto, of the availability of a letter of credit on
which to draw.'6 Nonetheless, Chilewich may have needed to do more than
open an international letter of credit to commence performance since the opening
of a letter of credit does not equate to payment. 67 The court did not address
this, nor did it justify its assumption that Chilewich's opening of a letter of credit
indicated commencement of performance.
Finally, Filanto may not have had a duty to alert Chilewich of its objections.
The court stated that "[iun light of the extensive [course of] prior dealing between
[the] parties, Filanto was certainly under a duty to alert Chilewich in a timely
fashion to its objections."'' 6  In doing so, the court interpreted Filanto's silence
as an objection to the proposition that Filanto had a "duty" to relay to
Chilewich.' 69 For support, the court cited the first part of CISG article 18(1),
which reads, "A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating
assent to an offer is an acceptance."' 70 The court interpreted "other conduct" in
CISG article 18(1) to encompass Filanto's silence, and thus ruled that Filanto
accepted the offer by its silence.17 ' This contradicts the second sentence of
CISG article 18(1) which reads, "Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount
to acceptance."'72 The court addressed this by referring to CISG article 8(3),
which the court stated allowed it to consider past relations between the parties to
assess whether a party's conduct is an acceptance. 73
164. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238.
165. Id at 1239-40.
166. M.A. DAVIS, THE DOCUMENTARY CREDITS HANDBOOK 4 (3d ed. 1990).
167. FRANS P. DERoOY, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 69 (1984). The author points out that "[t]he documentary
credit is not a payment; [rather] it provides a possibility of obtaining payment" Id. (emphasis added).
168. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
169. Id
170. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 18(1).
171. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
172. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 18(1).
173. Id. CISG article 8(3) states:
In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct
of the parties.
Id art. 8(3). The court used this article in conjunction with article 11, which states that a contract "may be
proved by any means, including witnesses." Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240. See also CISG, supra note 4, art.
11 (providing that a contract may be proved by any means, including witnesses).
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Here, the court used its own interpretation of one article of the CISG to offset
an express provision of another article of the CISG. The court reasoned that
article 8(3) of the CISG allowed the court to consider the parties' prior relations
to assess whether Filanto's inactivity was an acceptance.174 This is contrary to
the CISG's express statement that "mere inactivity does not constitute accep-
tance."175 The court's application of article 8(3) illustrates an extreme example
of judicial fiction, primarily because the facts do not state or describe the prior
dealings between the parties.
B. Alternative Arguments that Could Have Been Raised in the Case
As a general assumption, both Chilewich and Filanto stipulated that the March
13, 1990 memorandum agreement was an offer. 76 The question is whether
Filanto accepted the terms of the March 13, 1990 memorandum agreement by
signing it, attaching a cover letter with exclusions, and returning it some five
months later.'n The answer essentially depends on how the facts are character-
ized.
One point Chilewich asserted is that even if Filanto did not accept by way of
returning the March 13, 1990 memo on August 7, 1990, Filanto nevertheless had
already accepted the terms of the memorandum by silence. If this is the case,
Filanto's signed and returned memorandum agreement amounted to either a new
offer or a modification proposal, both of which Chilewich promptly rejected via
Byerly Johnson on August 29, 1990.178
Although this argument has merit, it would fail under the CISG because
articles 18(1) and 8(3) suggest that silence does not constitute acceptance unless
established by the parties' prior conduct. 79 Here, the facts do not state any prior
conduct of the parties where silence was intended as an acceptance. Thus Filanto,
by its silence, did not accept the terms of the March 13, 1990 memorandum
agreement.
A second argument is that Filanto did not accept by way of returning the
March 13, 1990 memo on August 7, 1990 because the offer reflected by the
memo had lapsed by August 7, 1990. Article 18(2) of the CISG states in part,
"An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent does not reach the
offeror within the time he has fixed, or if no time is fixed, within a reasonable
174. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
175. See CISG, supra note 4, art. 18(1).
176. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1238.
177. Id at 1231-32.
178. Id at 1232.
179. See CISG, supra note 4, arts. 18(1), 8(3). Article 18(l) states the main proposition, "Silence or
inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance," while article 8(3) provides the exception by stating, "[In]
determining the intent of [the] part[ies] ... due consideration is to be given to ... any practices which the
parties have established between themselves." Id.
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time." ' If trade usage shows .that five months is not a reasonable time for
reply, a court could find that the March 13, 1990 offer lapsed. If so, Filanto's
signed and returned memorandum agreement amounted to either a new offer or
an attempt to accept the original offer after renewing it. If it is a new offer, there
is no contract because Chilewich promptly rejected via Byerly Johnson on August
29, 1990. The argument that it was an attempt to renew the original offer
contained in the March 13, 1990 memo would fail because the offeror is the
master of the offer and only the offeror can renew the offer after it has
lapsed.' Thus, under the latter assumption, there is no contract.
Finally, Filanto could have argued that it did not accept by way of returning
the March 13, 1990 memo on August 7, 1990, because while purporting to be an
acceptance, attachment of the cover letter excluding the arbitration clause from
the Russian Contract amounted to a material modification. Under article 19 of the
CISG, "A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains...
[a material] modification is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counterof-
fer."' 82 Under the same article, an arbitration clause would be considered a
material term.8 3 Thus, Filanto's return of Chilewich's memo amounted to a
counteroffer which Chilewich rejected.
The above arguments aside, Chilewich's rejection via Byerly Johnson on
August 29, 1990, can also be characterized as a counteroffer,' which would
have been accepted by conduct. Chilewich bought and paid for 60,000 pairs of
shoes, which Filanto delivered. 85 The question is whether the arbitration clause
was incorporated into the contract. The answer depends on whose oral testimony
one believes. Filanto said that on the weekend of September 2, 1990, Chilewich
agreed that the contract would not incorporate the arbitration clause.1 86 Chile-
wich said that on the weekend of September 14, 1990, Filanto agreed to the
180. Id. art. 18(2).
181. FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 144.
182. CISG, supra note 4, art. 19. Article 19 provides:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or
other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counteroffer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or
different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance,
unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice
to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with
the modifications contained in the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, payment, quality and
quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or
the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.
Id.
183. Id. art. 19(3). See supra notes 95-97 (comparing the CISG and the UCC on this point).
184. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1232.
185. Id. at 1233.
186. Id.
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arbitration clause."8 7 If both are believed by the fact finder, then the contract
incorporates the arbitration clause and the matter would be arbitrated in Russia.
This is because Filanto's agreement with the arbitration clause on September 14,
1990 was the last interaction between the parties recognized by the court.' If
only Filanto is believed, the contract does not incorporate the arbitration clause
and the matter may be heard in New York. Alternatively, if only Chilewich is
believed, the contract incorporates the arbitration clause and the matter would be
heard in Russia.
VI. CONCLUSION
Filanto reflects a changing attitude, by at least the federal judiciary in New
York, that the CISG has a place in U.S. business transactions. With potential
widespread use, it is important for an attorney to understand the hidden complexi-
ties of the CISG; complexities which may lead to serious error.'89 Undoubtedly,
case law will further define the terms of the CISG and unravel a few of the
complexities that exist. Until then, the transnational practitioner must be aware of
varying interpretations, to which even leading authorities on the CISG fall
prey.19
Varying interpretations aside, the transnational practitioner can take comfort
in that CISG articles 7 and 8 provide for the interpretation of the convention's
articles,' 9' as well as the interpretation of the contracting parties' statements and
187. Id.
188. Id
189. Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in International Trade:
First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 249 (1993).
190. See John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 11, 15 (1988)
(discussing formation of contracts under the CISG). One should note that Professors John Honnold and E. Allan
Farnsworth, two leading authorities on the CISG, disagree as to whether the CISG provides a solution when the
price is missing from the contract terms. While Professor Farnsworth believes the problem remains unsolved,
Professor Honnold suggests that article 55 of the CISG addresses a missing price term adequately. Id. Article
55 of the CISG states that "[w]here a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly
fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any indication to
the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the
contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned." CISG, supra note 4, art.
55.
191. CISG, supra note 4, art. 7. Article 7 provides:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in
international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in
it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law.
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conduct. 192 Noted treatises provide further guidance as to how articles 7 and 8
are to be applied. 193 Additionally, the CISG is rich in legislative history that
spans over three decades.' 9 If the practitioner traces the provision backwards
from the final draft in 1980 through preceding numeral and content changes, the
practitioner can grasp a sense of the policy behind the provision and use this to
argue a case. 95 Until further case law is developed, scholarly writings and the
legislative history of each provision may be the only guidance available to the
practitioner.196
For now, in the District Court for the Southern Di~trict of New York, the
CISG has been held to allow acceptance by silence if this is the parties' prior
course of dealing. 97 This article sought to prove that the court failed to
factually support the conclusion that the parties had been conducting themselves
as such. 98 Depending on the facts, this article then provided several alternative
conclusions. This was possible despite the lack of case law because of the earlier
mentioned availability of noted scholars' opinions, their writings, and the
legislative history of the CISG.
The CISG has come full circle from theory to practice, from a convention of
noted scholars to interpretation in a U.S. court. It is gaining acceptance in the
international community. Today and in the future, the transnational practitioner
faced with CISG interpretation must be prepared and knowledgeable, or else run
the risk of losing to a more knowledgeable opponent, or as in this case, to the
whims of an opposite, but not necessarily correct, viewpoint of the trier of fact.
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192. Id. art. 8. Article 8 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware
what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind
as the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understand a reasonable person would have had, due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations,
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.
IU
193. See generally HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 113-43; Eorsi, supra note 150, at 2-1 to 2-20; Michael
J. Bonell, Interpretation of Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 60,
at 65, 65-94; E. Allan Farnsworth, Interpretation of Contract, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW, supra note 60, at 95, 95-102.
194. HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 115.
195. Id. at 37. Professor Honnold provides a detailed methodology on how to trace the history of a CISG
provision. Id. at 37-43.
196. I1& at 114-15.
197. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1240.
198. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.

